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Abstract. In this paper three computational models for the study of the evolu-
tion of cooperation under cultural propagation are studied: Kin Selection, Direct 
Reciprocity and Indirect Reciprocity. Two analyzes are reported, one compar-
ing their behavior between them and a second one identifying the impact that 
different parameters have in the model dynamics. The results of these analyzes 
illustrate how game transitions may occur depending of some parameters within 
the models and also explain how agents adapt to these transitions by individual-
ly choosing their attachment to a cooperative attitude. These parameters regu-
late how cooperation can self-organize under different circumstances. The 
emergence of the evolution of cooperation as a result of the agent’s adapting 
processes is also discussed.  
1 Introduction 
Urban traffic problems have a complex behavior even in their most simplistic ab-
stractions [2]. This behavior becomes more complex when driver interaction is added 
[10]. With these two premises, in this paper, three computational models, which were 
originally intended for studying driving behaviors and their impact in traffic, are pre-
sented. The aim is to explore the possibilities for controlling some of the complex 
characteristics of traffic, e.g. the consequences of driver interactions. The possibility 
of using them for other social problems is also discussed. 
The models were conceived to study the evolution of cooperation [1], which stud-
ies how cooperative behaviors are preserved when selfish behaviors offer greater 
individual rewards, e.g. drivers who yield at lane changes or crossings, animal fe-
males taking care of their offspring, students who don’t betray each other. Several 
abstractions for simulating different circumstances in which this phenomenon occurs 
have been proposed [6]. The models are based in three abstractions of different ob-
served situations in which cooperation evolves [4]. Table 1 shows these abstractions 
as theoretical games in which players may choose between two behaviors: coopera-
tive or selfish. When a player chooses to cooperate she has to pay a cost that her game 
partner is going to receive as a benefit. In each game, the decision of the players is 
influenced by a different probabilistic variable. This variable represents some feature 
that is exploited by the global behavior to favor the evolution of cooperation. For the 
kin selection strategy, relationships are exploited, the relation may be genetic, emo-
tional or of any other type but as long as it its closer, cooperation will be more fre-
quent. In the direct reciprocity case, the evolution of cooperation is linked with the 
probability of one player to play again with the same partner, and this condition is set 
because players are responding cooperation with cooperation and defection with de-
fection. The feature exploited by the indirect reciprocity case is peer pressure. While 
more players get to know the actions of a determined player, she will obtain more 
benefits by cooperating and while fewer players get to know her actions more benefits 
she will obtain by defecting. Each strategy has a condition for the cooperation to be-
come an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS, cooperators survive), another when coop-
eration becomes risk-dominant (RD, cooperators are near 1/2 of the population) and 
other when cooperators are advantageous (AD, cooperators are near 2/3 of the popula-
tion). 
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Table 1. Rules for the three game strategies [4]. 
2 The Models 
We developed agent-based computational models, using the NetLogo [12] plat-
form, to better understand three strategies for the evolution of cooperation: kin selec-
tion, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity [4]. Unlike the results shown in [4] 
these models are focused in cultural evolution (players may choose to cooperate or 
not under different circumstances instead of been born as players who always cooper-
ate or always defect), therefore, the first characteristic these models share is that they 
have a constant population. The behavior of the agents is similar to the one of agents 
described in Skyrm’s Matching Pennies model [8]. Agents have a cooperation proba-
bility variable (cp) that determines their attachment to a cooperator strategy, while 
this variable gets a greater value the agent will cooperate more frequently. We will 
use this variable for deciding if the agents will cooperate or not in a particular game. 
Each agent is able to identify herself as a cooperator or as a defector: 
 If 5.0)( ipcp  then ii pc   and 0id  
 If 5.0)( ipcp  then ii pd  and 0ic  
Where pi is the i
th
 agent or player, ci is the i
th
 cooperator and di is the i
th
 defector. 
As a consequence of this characteristic, a partition of the population can be made. 
The initial proportions of cooperative versus defective agents in the population (ipc 
and ipd) are relevant parameters of the model although they can be reduced to one as 
ipc=1-ipd. In order to identify agents as cooperators or defectors at the beginning of 
the simulations we give them an initial cp, thus, initial cp of defectors (iicpd) and 
initial cp of cooperators (icpc) are two more parameters. The agents move through a 
defined two-dimensional space. It has been seen [3] that in such cases population 
density is a key determinant of the dynamics, so the number of players (population) 
interacting in the defined space is another important parameter of the model. 
Agents interact following the payoff tables corresponding to each strategy studied. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the three strategies share two variables: the benefit (b) one 
agent gives to another while cooperating and the cost (c) paid by the cooperator while 
cooperating. With the purpose of keeping track of the player’s decisions, each one of 
them is assigned a fitness value from where the cost will be subtracted and the bene-
fits will be added. 
Appendix A shows the instructions executed by the agents during each iteration of 
the simulations. The behaviors of each game are detailed in appendix B. 
2.1 Tune cooperation probability 
Agents adapt to the environment by modifying whether they are going to cooperate 
or defect in the next round. We implemented several exogenous tuning algorithms 
based on the literature [8][9][6][7][11] with no satisfactory results. We developed two 
self-organizing tuning alternatives and were tested with very good results: 
 Selfish fitness: the agents only take their own fitness value as a parameter, unlike 
other algorithms that take into account the values of all the other players or values 
of the game partners. If the player cooperates or defects, and her fitness increases, 
then the agent increases or decreases her cp respectively. If the player cooperates 
or defects, and her fitness is reduced, then the agent decreases or increases her cp 
respectively. And if there is no change in the agent’s fitness, then there is no 
change in her cp. 
 Selfish profit: this is very similar 
to the previous one, but instead 
of comparing fitness values (sum 
of all profits obtained), agents act 
based in the comparison of the 
profit of their last game and the 
profit of the current round. Thus, 
if the player cooperates or defects 
and the actual profit is greater 
than the last one, then the agent 
increases or decreases her cp. If 
the player cooperates or defects 
and the actual profit is lower than 
the last one, then the agent de-
creases or increases her cp. Final-
ly if the last profit is equal to the 
actual profit, then there is no 
change in the cp value. 
3 Methods 
Before general results were ob-
tained, an analysis of the variables 
was conducted. A primary goal of 
this analysis was to determine the 
impact of the parameters on the 
dynamics of the models. A second-
ary goal was to obtain parameter 
values that best exemplify the mod-
el’s behavior. Detailed information 
about the experiments may be found 
in appendix C. 
Fig. 1. Graphics of the payoff table behaviors for x’s 
values in the range [0,1] for a) Kin Selection, b) 
Indirect Reciprocity and c) Direct Reciprocity (DR is 
in logarithmic scale). 
4 Results 
Interesting results can be derived from a careful analysis of the graphics of the payoff 
table behavior as the corresponding probability takes values within the range [0,1] 
(Figure 1). As x has a higher value, the agents move to different games. Using the 
same notations as in [6] that designates R (reward) when two agents cooperate, P 
(punishment) when two players defect, T (temptation) when one player defects and 
the other cooperates and S (sucker´s payoff) when one player cooperates and the other 
defects; the move from game to game is described in appendix D.  The values of b 
and c also determine the transition value of x that takes the agents from one game to 
another. It is important to notice that the agents respond to these transitions by inter-
acting with the others and adapt by using only simple local rules with only two basic 
requirements: 1) the agents must know how to distinguish that an amount is bigger 
than other and 2) the agents must have the notion of more is better. Within the strate-
gies studied, other requirements are implicitly given for each case and are described 
in the appendix E. 
4.1 ESS, RD and AD conditions 
It was shown in Table 1, when the x variable reaches certain value, ESS, RD and 
AD behaviors emerge. Figure 2 shows the characteristic behavior obtained by the 
analysis described in the behavior part of the Methods section; in it, these expected 
behaviors are not noticeable. Analyzing the model variables, we could find that these 
conditions are preserved, but the effect can be observed by setting the starting popula-
tion of cooperators as 2/3, 1/2 and 1/3 of the total population for ESS, RD and AD 
respectively and obtaining a graphic similar to Figure 2. This result is shown in ap-
pendix F along with the impact of all the parameters to each strategy. 
 
Fig. 2.Percentage of cooperating population while the corresponding probability is varied. 
4.2 Self-organization 
Self-organization seems to be a key element for the cultural evolution of coopera-
tion. There are several studies [8][9][6][7][11] in which the agents just can choose 
between cooperate or defect. In the models presented here, the players can choose the 
degree of cooperation that they consider the best. Another important difference be-
tween our models and the others [6][7] is the inclusion of a probabilistic variable so 
that agents choose the degree of cooperation by comparing their actual state with a 
past one instead of comparing their state with the state of others. This is important 
because each agent may be seen as an individual system adaptable to different envi-
ronments or contexts using the information given by the interactions with other simi-
lar, not necessarily equal, systems. 
5 Conclusions 
Three agent-based computational models for the study of the evolution of coopera-
tion under cultural propagation were described. It was shown that their behavior is the 
result of transitions between games defined by Game Theory. The transitions are con-
sequences of the structure determined by the payoff matrixes of the three strategies 
studied. Each of these strategies abstracts well-known real behaviors [4]; hence the 
importance of creating computational models that let us experiment exhaustively 
different circumstances for these phenomena, a difficult task with living organisms. 
The impact of the parameters in each model was analyzed to better understand how to 
manipulate the models and adapt them for more specific studies, such as social phe-
nomena (e.g. bulling, market formation, and migration), traffic problems (e.g. signal-
ing issues, conflicting use of roads) and biological processes (e.g. interactions be-
tween organisms and populations). 
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Appendixes 
A: General behavior of the agents. 
program Iteration (pi) 
{It must be guaranteed that each agent has followed the 
last instruction, then the next one may be executed} 
var  cooperate(pi): Boolean ; 
var  pj: Agent ; 
begin 
1 rotate left (random (50)); 
2 rotate right (random(50)); 
3 move forward number of steps(1); 
4 find neighbors at distance (1); 
5 pj:= engage ;{this procedure are going to return the 
game partner of agent pi} 
6 play ; 
7 get consequences ; 
8 tune cooperation probability ; 
end. 
The lines 1-3 let the agents set a straight line direction but with some noise. In line 
4, the agents look for other agents near them within one cell distance. The engage 
instruction prompts the agents to choose one neighbor (if any). Once a pair of agent 
engages in a game they became ineligible for other agents. The procedures in lines 6-
7 contain details of each strategy. 
B: Games behavior. 
Kin selection 
Under this strategy the agents, engaged in a game, participate in a naive way sup-
posing that they are involved in some kind of relationship. Although a player may be 
a cooperator, there are going to be conditions under which she will not cooperate. For 
example, she might not be in the mood or she isn’t fast enough to do the action re-
quired by the other agent. The random decision based on the variable cp permits to 
simulate this and also how an agent overlooks these conditions while her cooperator 
attitude gets stronger (cp gets higher values).  
program play kin selection 
var  decision: Real; 
begin 
decision:= random (0,1); 
if ( decision <= cp(pi) ) 
cooperate(pi):= true ; 
else 
cooperate(pi):= false ; 
end 
Once the players have simultaneously defined their actions, they move to the get 
consequences phase in which they add or subtract units from their fitness following 
the upper section of Table 1. 
The tune cooperation probability phase is explained later in its own section. 
Direct Reciprocity 
In [5] a detailed explanation of the agents is given. There are two types of agents: 
a) agents following an always defect strategy (defectors) and b) agents following tit-
for-tat strategy (cooperators) that will start with cooperation. Technically, a Boolean 
array may be added to each agent for the tit-for-tat strategy implementation so, on the 
array of a player pi the last action of an agent pj will be recorded. To analyze the cul-
tural propagation of cooperation, adjustments to these rules were made and the behav-
ior is the following: 
program play direct reciprocity 
var:  decision: Real ; 
begin 
decision:= random (0,1) ; 
if (decision <= cp(pi)) 
begin 
if (array[j] == true) 
cooperate(pi):= true ; 
else 
cooperate(pi):= false ; 
end 
else 
begin 
cooperate(pi):= false ; 
end 
end 
For the get consequences phase, once the players have simultaneously defined their 
actions they add or subtract units form their fitness following the middle section of 
Table 1. 
Indirect reciprocity 
The development of the games under this strategy is also specified in [5]. Here the 
q value has a more important role. Before making a decision, each player has the 
probability of knowing if his game partner is a defector or a cooperator. A defector 
will never cooperate, while a cooperator will always cooperate if his partner is a co-
operator and will not cooperate if the partner is a defector. A cooperator will cooper-
ate with a defector with a probability 1-q, simulating the fact that the cooperator 
couldn’t recognize the other as a defector. To study the cultural evolution of coopera-
tion, the game is structured like the next code: 
program play indirect reciprocity 
var:  decision, recognition: Real ; 
begin 
decision:= random (0,1) ; 
recognition:= random (0,1) ; 
if (pi == ci and pj == cj) {if both players are coopera-
tors} 
begin 
if (recognition <= (1 – q)) {if pi don’t recognize pj 
as a cooperator} 
begin 
if (decision <= cp(pi)) 
cooperate(pi):= true ; 
else 
 cooperate(pi):= false ; 
end 
else {if pi recognize pj as a cooperator} 
cooperate(pi)=true ; 
end  
else 
begin 
if (pi == ci and pj == dj) {if pj isn’t a cooperator} 
begin 
if (recognition <= (1 – q)) {if pi don’t recognize 
pj as a defector} 
begin 
if (decision <= cp(pi)) 
cooperate(pi):= true ; 
else 
cooperate(pi):= false ; 
end 
else {if pi recognize pj as a defector} 
cooperate(pi):= false ; 
end 
else 
begin 
if (pi == di) {if pi is a defector} 
begin 
if (decision <= cp(pi)) 
cooperate(pi):= true ; 
else 
cooperate(pi):= false ; 
end 
end 
end 
end 
When the players have simultaneously defined their actions, the behavior of the get 
consequences phase is to add or subtract units form their fitness following the lower 
part of Table 1. 
C: Detailed methodology. 
The size of the space in which agents interacted was thirteen by thirteen cells with 
1:1 agent-cell proportion and each agent step was proportioned to 1:1 cell length. The 
space has no boundaries so it has a toroidal shape. 
Each strategy was treated with similar analyzes with few differences in sampling. 
The analyzes were constructed with the idea of studying the global system in stable 
conditions thus it is similar to the one described in [3] and consist of simulations run-
ning 100,000 iterations outputting the average percentage of cooperators in the popu-
lation. The averages were taken for the last 5,000 iterations. A simulation was made 
for each possible configuration described in the following sections: 
─ Payoff table behavior: as it can be seen in Table 1, each strategy is dependent on three 
variables: b, c, and depending on the strategy, r, w, or q. Variables b and c were fixed b=4 
and c=2 arbitrarily, while r, w or q (that from now on will be denoted as x) took values from 
the range [0.01 , 1] for kin selection (KS) and indirect reciprocity (IR) strategies and from 
[0.01 , 0.99] for direct reciprocity (DR). In each case, samples were taken every 0.01 steps 
in the x’s range. w=1 was omitted to avoid division by zero. 
 
─ Tuning criterion (TC): as explained in the Model section, after each game the agents try to 
adapt their behavior to the environment (tune cooperation probability). There are two crite-
ria to do so: one based on the agent’s fitness (sf) and another one based on the agent’s profit 
(sp). For this part of the analysis, each parameter was arbitrarily fixed to the values de-
scribed in Table 2. 
 
 
 B C icpc icpd popu-
lation 
ipc ipd X’s range Sampling 
interval 
TC 
KS 4 2 0.65 0.35 60 0.5 0.5 [0.01- 1] 0.01 [sf, sp] 
DR 4 2 0.65 0.35 20 0.5 0.5 [0.01- 0.99] 0.01 [sf, sp] 
IR 4 2 0.65 0.35 60 0.5 0.5 [0.01- 1] 0.02 [sf, sp] 
Table 2. Parameter‘s settings for experiments in Tuning criterion section. 
─ Initial probabilities: as mentioned while describing the model, each agent begins with 
some probability for cooperation. Starting from this section the results from previous ones 
are taken into account, thus, the parameters used for this experiments are detailed in Table 3. 
 
 B C icpc icpd popu-
lation 
ipc ipd X’s range Sampling 
interval 
TC 
KS 4 2 [0.65, 
0.75, 
0.85, 
0.95, 
0.99] 
[0.01, 
0.05, 
0.15, 
0.25, 
0.35] 
60 0.5 0.5 [0.01- 1] 0.05 sf 
DR 4 2 [0.65, 
0.75, 
0.85, 
0.95, 
0.99] 
[0.01, 
0.05, 
0.15, 
0.25, 
0.35] 
20 0.5 0.5 [0.01- 0.99] 0.05 sp 
IR 4 2 [0.5, 
0.51, 
0.55, 
0.65, 
0.75, 
0.85, 
0.95, 
0.99] 
[0.01, 
0.05, 
0.15, 
0.25, 
0.35, 
0.45, 
0.49, 
0.5] 
60 0.5 0.5 [0.01- 1] 0.05 sp 
Table 3. Parameter’s settings for the experiments of the Initial probability section. Values in 
bold font represent results of previous sections. 
─ Population: in this part the impact of the number of players was explored. It was expected 
that there would be no impact for KS and IR but, in DR the population should be an im-
portant issue. The parameters used are described in Table 4.  
 
 
  B C icpc icpd popu-
lation 
ipc ipd X’s range Sampling 
interval 
TC 
KS 4 2 0.65 0.35 [10, 
20, 30, 
40, 50, 
60, 70, 
80, 90, 
100] 
0.5 0.5 [0.01- 1] 0.04 sf 
DR 4 2 0.65 0.35 [2, 4, 
6, 8, 
10, 20, 
30, 40, 
50, 60, 
70, 80, 
90, 
100] 
0.5 0.5 [0.01- 0.99] 0.04 sp 
IR 4 2 0.98 0.45 [10, 
20, 30, 
40, 50, 
60, 70, 
80, 90, 
100] 
0.5 0.5 [0.01- 1] 0.04 sp 
Table 4. Parameter’s settings for the experiments of the Popultaion section. Values in bold font 
represent results of previous sections. 
Robustness: as the name would suggest, the idea behind this test was to know the robust-
ness of the strategy by varying the initial proportion of cooperators. The initial proportions 
were [0, 0.333, 0.5, 0.666, 1], complementary initial proportion of defectors were fixed to 
get the population discussed in the population section. The rest of the parameters were fixed 
as Table 5 details. 
 
 B C icpc icpd popu-
lation 
ipc ipd X’s range Sampling 
interval 
TC 
KS 4 2 0.65 0.35 60 [0, 
0.333, 
0.5, 
[1, 
0.666, 
0.5, 
[0.01- 1] 0.02 sf 
0.666, 
1] 
0.666, 
0] 
DR 4 2 0.65 0.35 20 [0, 
0.333, 
0.5, 
0.666, 
1] 
[1, 
0.666, 
0.5, 
0.666, 
0] 
[0.01- 0.99] 0.02 sp 
IR 4 2 0.98 0.45 60 [0, 
0.333, 
0.5, 
0.666, 
1] 
[1, 
0.666, 
0.5, 
0.666, 
0] 
[0.01- 1] 0.02 sp 
Table 5. Parameter’s settings for the experiments of the Robustness section. Values in bold 
font represent results of previous sections. 
─ Behavior: finally average behaviors were measured. The parameters were fixed as showed 
in Table 6 and the results are the averages of the outputs of 10 simulations for every sample 
interval.  
 
 B C icpc icpd popu-
lation 
ipc ipd X’s range Sampling 
interval 
TC 
KS 4 2 0.65 0.35 60 0.5 0.5 [0.01- 1] 0.02 sf 
DR 4 2 0.65 0.35 20 1 0 [0.01- 0.99] 0.02 sp 
IR 4 2 0.98 0.45 60 0.5 0.5 [0.01- 1] 0.02 sp 
Table 6. Parameter’s settings for the experiments of the Behavior section. Values in bold font 
represent results of previous sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
D: Game transitions 
 
Strategy Graph section Parameters Game Tension(s) included in each dilemma 
Kin selection 
rc
b 1
  
T > R > P > S Prisoner’s Dilemma Players prefer T to R. 
Players prefer P to S. 
Kin selection 
rc
b 1
  
R > T > S > P Unidentified game Cooperators always win. 
Players prefer T to S. 
Kin selection 1r  R > T = S > P Unidentified game Cooperators always win. 
There are no preference between T and S. 
Direct reciprocity 
wc
b 1
  T > R > P > S Prisoner’s Dilemma Players prefer T to R. 
Players prefer P to S. 
Direct reciprocity 
wc
b 1
  R > T > P > S Stag Hunt Players prefer P to S 
Direct reciprocity 1w  R > T > P > S Stag Hunt Players prefer P to S 
Indirect reciprocity 
qc
b 1

 T > R > P > S Prisoner’s Dilemma Players prefer T to R. 
Players prefer P to S. 
Indirect reciprocity 
qc
b 1

 R > T > P > S Stag Hunt Players prefer P to S 
Indirect reciprocity 1q  R > T = P = S Unidentified game Only when both players cooperate they win. 
Table 7. Comparison of the game transitions using a format similar to the one used in [6]. 
E: Implicit requirements for each game. 
Kin selection 
The additional condition is: agents must be able to determining the probability of 
genetic relatedness to other agents. In nature this is frequently observed, for example, 
a tiger is able of realize that it is in the territory of another tiger by the smell. Inde-
pendently of the actual mechanisms used by living systems for determining genetic 
relatedness, we have found that this strategy is very robust. Independently of the ini-
tial proportion of cooperators in the population, if b/c > 1/r then, cooperators and 
defectors can coexist. A particular question may arise: if kin selection is so robust for 
the evolution of cooperation, why cooperative behaviors do not always occur among 
individuals of the same species, such as bulling between students or the same tiger of 
the last example fighting for territory with another tiger? One possible answer is that 
the ability to estimate relatedness depends on the individuals, but the perceptions of b 
and c are codependent of the environment and of the subjective perception of individ-
uals. A clear and sad example of this is: the polar bears, when a female polar bear has 
cubs and there have been no food for several days, the mother can commit cannibal-
ism. In this case the genetic relatedness perception remains the same (r=1) but the 
lack of food increases perception of the cost value for the mother and a deplorable 
non-cooperative consequence occurs. 
Direct reciprocity 
At a first glance, the additional condition of this case seems to be the ability of 
agents to know the probability that they have of playing again with another particular 
agent. Analyzing this strategy, it may be noticed that the results of this case were 
those with the highest error rate compared with the expected behavior. The most rea-
sonable explanation is that, somehow, the agents notice the difference between the 
given w (set as a parameter) and the real one (given by the number of players in the 
area). One possibility is that agents attend so much to the given w with wrong results 
that they stop paying attention to it, although this requires further analysis. 
Indirect reciprocity 
The additional condition here is the ability of the agents to estimate in which pro-
portion they actions are known by the rest of the population. This ability is only seen 
in organisms with complex social interactions. The analysis conducted showed that 
the global behavior of this case is sensitive to the initial probabilities for cooperation 
of the players; it was necessary to fix initial cp of cooperator=0.99 and initial cp of 
defectors=0.5 for the model to show the expected behavior (ESS behavior under b/c > 
1/x conditions). When icpc set lower or icpd is set higher, the point in the x’s range in 
which the cooperating population may survive is displaced to the right, thus, more 
players knowing the actions of other players are required for cooperation to evolve. 
This may be understood as the effect of a cultural stance to a particular subject. For 
example, corruption: if the population has cultural aspects that favor corruption, then 
the initial probability of cooperators and defectors will have a low value.  
F: Impact of the parameters to each strategy 
 
 
Parameter Effect in strategy 
Kin Selection Direct Reciprocity Indirect Reciprocity 
Selfish fitness Interaction between players and 
parameters allow the emergency of 
ESS, RD and AD behaviors. 
No distinguishable patterns can be 
observed. 
Interaction between players and 
parameters allow the emergency of 
ESS, RD and AD behaviors. 
Selfish profit If b/c < 1/r all players are defector. 
If b/c > 1/r all players are coopera-
tors. In both cases all the other 
parameters are irrelevant. 
Interaction between players and 
parameters allow the emergency of 
distinguishable patterns for ESS, 
RD and AD behaviors. 
Interaction between players and 
parameters allow the emergency of 
ESS, RD and AD behaviors but 
later in x’s range when compared 
with the results of selfish fitness. 
Benefit (b) Sets highest payoff that R can get. 
Sets starting value for T in the x’s 
range.  Along with x and c sets the 
value for R. 
Sets the value for T in the x’s range. 
Along with x and c sets the value for 
R. 
Sets the starting point for T in the 
x’s range. Along with c sets the 
value for R. 
Cost (c) Sets starting point for T. Sets 
starting and final points for S in the 
x’s range. Along with x and b sets 
the value for R. 
Sets the value of S. Sets the starting 
point for R in the x’s range. Along 
with x and b sets the value for R. 
Sets the starting point for S in the 
x’s range. Along with b sets the 
value for R. 
Initial probability 
of cooperators 
No significant impact. Noise generating variable; with 
higher values, the behavior becomes 
noisier in the x’s range points under 
b/c < 1/x 
Noise generating variable; with 
lower values, the behavior be-
comes noisier. 
Initial probability 
of defectors 
Noise generating variable; with 
lower values, the behavior becomes 
noisier. 
No significant impact Noise generating variable; with 
lower values, the behavior be-
comes noisier. 
Population No significant impact Noise generating variable; with 
higher values the behavior becomes 
noisier. 
Noise generating variable; with 
lower values, the behavior be-
comes noisier. 
Proportion of 
initial cooperators 
No significant impact With higher values the final 
proportion increases. 
With higher values the final 
proportion increases. 
Table 8. Comparison of the impact of the parameters in each strategy. 
 
